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Abstract. This work suggests the estimation method developed in relation to the position of the robotic 
system (RS) operator, showing his degree of risk proneness. The base models are: Hurwitz 
pessimism/optimism criterion and decision trees. The problem is solved using the reverse setting: we 
estimate pessimism/optimism parameter of the operator (decision taker) by observing what decisions 
he makes when controlling the RS. The solution context of such decision taker position estimation 
problems can be: using RS in emergency situations, in military actions and other situations connected 
with the uncertainty of the situation.  
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Introduction. Currently, operator-controlled 
robotic systems (RS) are widely used in a large 
application sphere such as emergency situations, 
space programs, military actions, medicine and 
some other spheres of RS application [1-4]. 
Everywhere in such applications the robot is a 
special manipulator providing the operator with 
more possibilities to influence the object of the 
manipulation. As a rule, all decisions in the 
situations occurring with RS are made by the 
operator who is actually a person that makes the 
decisions (decision taker) and the RS is actually his 
avatar, providing him with functionally new 
actuators and additional sensors that widen his basic 
capacities. 
When applying RS in emergency situations 
(ES) or in conditions of active resistance (for 
example during the active military actions or space 
missions), the most important role is played by the 
time factor. It means that the operator always has to 
choose either he should spend some time on the 
situation update and analysis or he should act, using 
his experience and intuition, i.e. to use the RS to 
perform the assignment. Functions that assess the 
condition of the operating environment of the RS as 
well as some special operations are often performed 
by different specialized RS [5].   
At that, the RS operators possess different 
level of experience, intuition, competence and risk 
proneness. Risk proneness position of the decision 
taker can range from extreme caution (pessimistic 
position) to high risk (optimistic position).  
Current tendencies of RS development going 
in direction of their intellectualization [6] and 
higher degree of independence [7] make the tasks of 
providing RS with such abilities as significant as the 
presence of an effective operator is. In this 
connection we deem important the research [8, 9] 
that is aimed at construction of models referring to 
different aspects of controlling (managerial) 
activity performed by an effective operator for their 
further use in independent effective RS. This work 
considers one of aspects used for building such 
models, which is the estimation (identification) of 
the risk proneness degree (position) of the RS 
operator calculated by observing the decisions he 
makes. 
Problem Set-Up. For the purposes of 
contextual certainty we shall take ES divisions that 
perform search & rescue and abandonment works at 
chemical or radioactive dangerous objects as an 
example. In such situations time is against the 
rescue workers, so that operators should make a 
choice on the basis of current situation: either they 
should perform additional situation appraisal or 
send the executor RS directly. After additional 
appraisal such dilemma appears again. A very 
cautious operator can perform additional appraisal 
for a long time not sending executor robots. A risky 
operator can send several robots at once to perform 
the task, and the further inspection will either prove 
him right or wrong. As a rule, experience and 
competence of the operator being the decision taker 
should provide maximum effectiveness of rescue 
operations. When the operator makes a decision, the 
degree of his risk proneness can be justified (i.e. 
providing an acceptable effectiveness to the whole 
rescue operation) or non-justified. This gives us 
grounds to suggest that for some certain ES there is 
an acceptable (allowable, effective) risk degree 
when making decisions.  
Thus we have a problem: what indicator 
should be used to measure the operator's proneness 
to risk and how it should be estimated when 
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observing the decisions that are made by a specific 
decision taker. The formal characterization of the 
problem is going to be executed by using the 
decision trees (nature games, positional strategic 
games) [10, 11] and Hurwitz pessimism/optimism 
criterion [12], which uses the parameter (indicator) 
that shows the decision taker's degree of risk 
proneness when making decisions. The formal 
presentation of the suggested method shall be 
performed using the model example. 
The operator's (decision taker) decision 
making problem shall be presented as a three-level 
decision tree (Picture 1) where the first (the lowest 
on the tree) outcome level (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) corresponds to 
four levels of the state of operating environment 
when there appeared a necessity in making a 
decision (𝑎 - absence of works for executor RS; 
𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑 - three levels of work scope in ascending 
order). However, these states possessing a different 
degree of certainty cannot be a priori known to the 
operator. They can be presented, for example, as a 
distribution of possibilities at the multitude of 
discrete states. Thus, the degree of certainty may 
vary from complete uncertainty (𝑃(𝑎) = 𝑃(𝑏) =
𝑃(𝑐) = 𝑃(𝑑) = 0.25) to complete certainty, for 
example 𝑃(𝑎) = 𝑃(𝑏) = 𝑃(𝑐) = 0;  𝑃(𝑑) = 1. 
Further it is presumed that the decision taker cannot 
assess the degree of uncertainty of a current state, 
only feeling it intuitively, thus making a decision 
regarding sending (1) or not sending (0) executor 
RS to execute the assignments (see the second level 
of the decision tree).       
At the third level the outcomes (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) have 
the same meaning as they have at the first one, but 
here some certain state (which is found by the 
executor RS) brings the specific values of the 
execution indicators (see the figures at the top of the 
tree) such as an area of the extinguished fire or a 
volume of the resource that was used to execute the 
assignment etc. Without loss of generality, let us 
assume that the outcome indicators located on the 
decision tree have the meaning of payments that the 
operator tries to maximize.     
If, when making decisions, the decision taker 
does not use any formal constructions but makes his 
choice on the basis of personal experience and intui-
tion, then, in proportion to his accumulated 
experience, considering many factors and his own 
hierarchy of values that were obtained and changed 
due to his own understanding of things, the 
alternatives chosen by him will become more and 
more effective. At that let us assume that there is a 
reverse connection existing, for example, in the 
form of posterior estimation of effectiveness of his 
actions taken when making decisions in relation to 
the situation or within some period of time. Such 
estimation of effectiveness can be performed by the 
senior control level, by an authorized person or 
collectively by some group of people.
 
 
Pic. 1. RS Control Decision Tree 
 
Solution. Let us consider the totality of the 
decision choice criteria presented by the combined 
Hurwitz criterion, on the basis of which we shall 
build the procedure of discovering the decision 
taker's position. The observations that we use herein 
are the "good" (effective) decisions used for 
building the choice model presented by the decision 
tree (see Picture 1). Within the multistep procedures 
of decision making, the algorithm of decision taker 
position identification shall be presented as a 
following sequence of stages. 
Stage 1. To execute the decision tree 
normalization procedure (presenting the problem in 
the normal form: as a matrix or a table) using one of 
existing methods [12]. At that the payments shall be 
presented as a payment matrix 𝐴 = ‖𝑎ℎ𝑗‖𝑚𝑛 where 
𝑚 is a value of pure strategies of the decision taker 
(lines) and 𝑛 is a value of nature conditions 
(columns).   
Stage 2. To build the dependency (from 𝜆 
parameter) of the good strategy 𝑓(𝜆) that was 
obtained using the Hurwitz criterion:
1 3 0 2 3 4 5 6 8 4 7 10 
0 0 0 1 1 1 
a     b     c     d a     b     c     d a     b     c     d 
a        b        c        d 
4 4 4 
4 
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𝑉 = max
𝑖
𝐿(𝑖) = max
𝑖
(𝜆 min
𝑗
𝑎𝑖𝑗 + (1 − 𝜆) max
𝑗
𝑎𝑖𝑗) ,                                                 (1) 
 
for example, by changing 𝜆 parameter at some 
regular grid within [0;1] interval.  As a result of 
such calculations, we shall build the dependency 
𝑓(𝜆), with the help of which the reverse 𝜆(𝑓) shall 
be built. 
Stage 3. Using the statistical data gathered 
when observing "good" decisions of the decision 
taker, i.e. using the most probable strategy 𝑓 out of 
all he would apply, and on the basis of reverse 
dependency 𝜆(𝑓) we shall compute the 𝜆 parameter 
that will correspond to the decision taker's position.  
Let us consider the realization of the algorithm 
taking into account model data presented at Picture 
1. 
For applying the algorithm of decision taker 
position identification let us generate 
implementations of the decisions (Table 1) made by 
the decision taker in the imitation mode for the 
following probabilities of nature conditions at the 
first and third steps: 𝑃(𝑎) = 0.3;  𝑃(𝑏) =
0.3;  𝑃(𝑐) = 0.3;  𝑃(𝑑) = 0.1. At that we shall 
assume that the decision taker possesses adequate 
experience, which allows us to consider all his 
decisions as "good" ones; thus they can be used in 
the statistical estimation. In the imitation mode we 
shall set 𝜆 = 0.7, i.e. the decision taker's position is 
close to cautious (here it is necessary to mention 
that 𝜆 = 1 corresponds to the position of extreme 
caution and extreme pessimism, while 𝜆 = 0 
corresponds to the position of extreme optimism). 
Table 1 contains a segment of the simulated 
condition observation sample (conditions of nature, 
operating environment), decisions made by the 
decision taker and final payment (effect). 
 
 Table 1. Segment of Observation Sample 
Observations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Step 1 (Nature) b b d c b b b b c b b c d c d 
Step 2 (Decision 
Taker) 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Step 3 (Nature) c a d d c c a b a c b a c d b 
Payment 4 4 4 8 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 8 4 
 
After having understood the state of the nature 
at the first step of the tree, it is possible to present 
the action of the operator as a strategy vector: 
𝑓 = [
𝑖
𝑗
𝑘
] , 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ {0; 1},          (2) 
where 0 and 1 are the alternatives, basing on which 
the decision taker makes a choice (see Picture 1 and 
Table 1) provided that at the first step the state was 
𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑 correspondingly. In this case eight strategies 
are possible, and the RS operator uses one of them:
  
𝑓1 = [
0
0
0
] ; 𝑓2 = [
0
0
1
] ;  𝑓3 = [
0
1
0
] ; 𝑓4 = [
0
1
1
] ; 𝑓5 = [
1
0
0
] ; 𝑓6 = [
1
0
1
] ; 𝑓7 = [
1
1
0
] ; 𝑓8 = [
1
1
1
].                (3)  
 
Using the implementation shown in Table 1 
we can see that if at the first step the nature is in 𝑏 
or in 𝑑 condition, the decision taker chooses the 0 
alternative; and if the nature is 𝑐, he chooses the 1 
alternative, which means that he uses 𝑓3 strategy.  
Further we shall execute the stage-by-stage 
algorithm provided above. 
Stage 1. Here we shall execute the decision 
tree normalization procedure. For this we have to 
determine the set elements of pure strategies of the 
decision taker and set elements of the nature 
conditions. The decision taker strategies have 
already been defined by the correlation (3). The 
multitude of nature conditions shall be defined as a 
multitude of combinations pertaining to outcomes 
of the first and the third steps, excluding the 
outcome 𝑎 at the first step as here the decision taker 
does not make any decisions. Thus, nature can have 
one out of 12 states with each of them presented as 
a vector of possible states of the operating 
environment at the first and the second steps of the 
decision tree correspondingly: 𝑠𝑗 = [𝑥 𝑦]
𝑇where 
𝑇 is a conjugation symbol; 𝑥 ∈ {𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑}; 𝑦 ∈
{𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑}. Then the whole set of states will be the 
following:
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𝑠1 = [
𝑏
𝑎
] ; 𝑠2 = [
𝑏
𝑏
] ; 𝑠3 = [
𝑏
𝑐
] ; 𝑠4 = [
𝑏
𝑑
] ; 𝑠5 = [
𝑐
𝑎
] ; 𝑠6 = [
𝑐
𝑏
] ;      
𝑠7 = [
𝑐
𝑐
] ;  𝑠8 = [
𝑐
𝑑
] ; 𝑠9 = [
𝑑
𝑎
] ; 𝑠10 = [
𝑑
𝑏
] ; 𝑠11 = [
𝑑
𝑐
] ; 𝑠12 = [
𝑑
𝑑
] .
}                              (4) 
 
Let us show the payments that correspond to 
the outcomes of the decision tree as Table 2, where, 
for purposes of brevity, we shall present the states 
using only a pair of their coordinate values.
 
 
Table 2. Normalized Payment Matrix 
 
𝑠𝑗 
ba bb bc bd ca cb cc cd da db dc dd 
𝑓ℎ 
000 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
001 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 4 7 10 
010 4 4 4 4 3 5 6 8 4 4 4 4 
011 4 4 4 4 3 5 6 8 0 4 7 10 
100 1 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
101 1 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 7 10 
110 1 2 3 4 3 5 6 8 4 4 4 4 
111 1 2 3 4 3 5 6 8 0 4 7 10 
 
Stage 2. In order to build the dependency of 𝑓 
good strategy from the parameter 𝜆 of the Hurwitz 
criterion (1), we shall vary it with the 0.1 step at the 
interval [0; 1], computing the values of objective 
function 𝐿(𝑖) for each step. The computational 
results are provided in Table 3. 
The last line in the table is the table record of 
𝑓(𝜆) function, where we can see that the reverse 
dependency 𝜆(𝑓) is a multidigit one, i.e. one value 
of the argument corresponds to the interval of 
values, for example 𝑓1 corresponds to the value 
interval of 𝜆 ranging from 0.8 to 1.0.  
  Stage 3. On the basis of the statistical data 
gathered from the alternative choice observations of 
the decision taker (see Table 1) we can deduce that 
the decision taker follows the 𝑓3 strategy. And the 
table dependency 𝜆(𝑓) shows that the coefficient of 
the Hurwitz criterion that reflects the decision 
taker's position is located within [0.5; 0.7] interval 
which complies with the original modelling data 
(we have set the 𝜆 = 0.7 value). The reverse 
problem has been solved.
 
Table 3. Objective Function Values According to the Hurwitz Criterion 
 
  
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
𝑓ℎ 
000 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
001 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 
010 8.0 7.5 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 
011 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 
100 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.0 
101 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 
110 8.0 7.3 6.6 5.9 5.2 4.5 3.8 3.1 2.4 1.7 1.0 
111 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 
𝐿∗(𝜆) 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 
𝑓∗(𝜆)  𝑓2 𝑓2 𝑓2 𝑓2 𝑓2 𝑓3 𝑓3 𝑓3 𝑓1 𝑓1 𝑓1 
 
Conclusions. The results obtained from the 
data of the model example can be explained in such 
a manner that having presented with the reiterated 
choice of decisions, the specific decision taker will 
receive a five unit payment on average by keeping 
to his 𝑓3 strategy. At that on the basis of the reverse 
problem solution it is possible to conclude that his 
risk proneness indicator is within [0.5; 0.7] interval. 
If such control-obtained effect is deemed 
satisfactory, in the future such level of risk 
proneness can be considered adequate; using it as a 
base, RS can be equipped with the systems of 
decision making support applied in similar 
situations and/or the suggested decision making 
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algorithm can be included in the software of the 
corresponding RS control system level.  
Thus, the suggested approach allows to 
provide the risk level that is considered adequate 
and which was approved by the experts who 
evaluate quality and effectiveness of the operations 
performed with the use of robotic systems.   
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